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Abstract
The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) has adopted the notion of ordinary
consumer for assessing confusion or deception in ‘deceptive marketing practices’ cases
under Section 10 of the Competition Act, 2010i. In its first order in this area, the CCP
defined ordinary consumer as a person who is ‘the usual, common or foreseeable user or
buyer of the product’ (CCPa, p. 30) and differs from the ‘ordinary prudent man’ under
contract law. According to the CCP, this conceptualisation of the Pakistani consumer was
important for achieving the goal of implementing the Competition Act 2010 in its letter
and spirit, the intent of the law (CCPa, p. 30) and that of protecting Pakistani consumers
from anti-competitive practices. Despite acknowledging that other jurisdictions such as
the EU and the US follow the standards of average and reasonable consumer,
respectively, the CCP considered that following these standards ‘would result in shifting
the onus from the Undertaking to the consumer and is likely to result in providing an easy
exit for Undertakings from the application of Section 10 of [CA, 2010]’. (CCPa, p. 30)
In this paper, I argue that the ordinary consumer of the CCP does not have any normative
basis either in law or in economics. This standard is also incompatible with the wellestablished Pakistani trademark law, which employs the notion of ‘consumer’ in line with
the concept of bounded rationality where the consumer is unable to make decisions that
maximise her utility. Defining the concept of consumer is also imperative as it has
practical ramifications for marketers. For example, in the presence of these conflicting
standards confusion is bound to arise as whether a marketing campaign should be
designed around the concept of consumer as defined by the CCP or around that adopted
by higher courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan in various trademarks (and
passing off or unfair competition) cases? Should marketers prepare separate campaigns
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for so that they are not caught by the provisions of either law? Would there be one
consumer profile from a target market or countless? And would there be a target market
or many?
To ensure normative as well as positive consistency; to provide legal certainty to
marketers and to meet consumer expectations, the CCP should refer to the representative
customer profile created by the marketers, in cases of deceptive marketing practices. This
is the consumer for whom the product or service or the marketing campaign is created
and she is the one who should not be deceived.
This paper starts with the introduction of the CCP and the provision on ‘deceptive
marketing practices’ in the Competition Act of 2010 (CA, 2010). I then discuss the
standard of ‘ordinary consumer’ as defined by the CCP in Zong and subsequent orders.
This is followed by the discussion of the basis of adoption of such standard including the
basis of rejection of the EU and US definitions of the consumer. In the fourth part I
discuss in detail the problem with the standard of ‘ordinary consumer’. The fifth part
comprises of the discussion of the notion of ‘consumer’ under the Pakistani trademark
law. I propose, in the sixth part, that the representative consumer profile created by the
marketer for the purposes of developing marketing campaigns is a more appropriate
standard and starting point for inquiry under Section 10 of the Competition Act, 2010.
The last part concludes.
Keywords: Consumer protection, deceptive marketing practices, Economics, Law,
Marketing, average consumer, ordinary consumer, reasonable consumer.
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1. Introduction*
The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) is charged with the task of monitoring
deceptive marketing practices in Pakistan. It achieves this goal by implementing Section
10 CA, 2010 which prohibits undertakings from entering into marketing practices that
may deceive consumers. Though, no definition of a ‘deceptive marketing practice’ is
provided in CA, 2010, a closed list of four marketing practices that are considered
deceptive is specified in Section 10(2) as follows:
a) the distribution of false or misleading information that is capable of harming the
business interests of another undertaking;
b) the distribution of false or misleading information to consumers, including the
distribution of information lacking a reasonable basis, related to the price,
character, method or place of production, properties, suitability for use, or quality
of goods;
c) false or misleading comparison of goods in the process of advertising; or
d) fraudulent use of another’s trademark, firm name, or product labelling or
packaging.
As the provision of correct information is one of the goals of Section 10 CA 2010
(Wilson, 2011), these four marketing practices are considered deceptive as they provide
or distribute false or misleading information that may be harmful for both consumers as
well as competitors. The marketing practices in sub-paragraphs (a), (c) & (d) cause direct
harm to competitors and indirect harm to consumers. The practice in sub-paragraph (b) is
harmful for consumer interests directly and competitor’s interest indirectly. ii
2. CCP’s Ordinary Consumer
To analyse the extent of deceptiveness in marketing practices, the CCP developed the
fiction of ‘ordinary consumer’. According to the CCP, if the ordinary consumer is
deceived by a marketing practice it will be held as deceptive. The CCP developed the test
of ‘ordinary consumer’ in its Zong order. The Zong order pertained to allegedly false and
*

I am indebted to Andrea Hüllmandel for here valuable discussion and valuable comments in the
preparation of this paper.
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misleading advertisements shown on various television channels by two cellular media
companies in Pakistan. The CCP held that the respective advertisements violated
paragraph (b) of Section 10(2) of [CA, 2010], as they distributed false or misleading
information to consumers (CCPa, p. 36 & 43).
The CCP considered it important to define the concept of ‘consumer’ under Section 10.
According to the CCP, the concept of consumer could not be the same as the contract
law’s ‘ordinary prudent man’. Hence, the ordinary consumer is relieved of all diligence,
prudence and care demanded from the ‘ordinary prudent man’. At the same time, The
CCP rejected the EU standard of ‘average consumer’ and the US ‘reasonable consumer’
standard (CCPa, p. 30).
The CCP defined the ‘ordinary consumer’ as ‘the usual, common or foreseeable user or
buyer of the product’ (CCPa, p. 30). This ‘ordinary consumer’ is not burdened with the
requirements of ‘ordinary diligence, caution/duty of care and ability to mitigate (possible
inquiries) [...]’ (CCPa, p. 30). Hence, these factors are not to be considered relevant on
the part of the ordinary consumer. In CCP’s opinion it was imperative to define
‘consumer’ ‘most liberally and in its widest amplitude’ to implement the law in letter and
spirit (CCPa, p. 30).
The CCP, at the same time placed a higher burden on marketers. It held that,
‘restricting [the] interpretation [of the term ‘consumer’] with the
use of the words ‘average’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘prudent’ will not only
narrow down and put constraints in the effective implementation of
the provision it would, rather be contrary to the intent of law. It
would result in shifting the onus from the Undertaking to the
consumer and is likely to result in providing an easy exit for
Undertakings from the application of Section 10 of [CA, 2010].’
(CCPa, p. 30)
In short, to achieve compliance with Section 10 and implementation of letter and spirit of
CA, 2010, the CCP adopted the standard of the ordinary consumer and placed a higher
burden of responsibility on the undertakings in relation to their marketing practices.
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The ‘ordinary consumer’ standard was confirmed in the Banks order.iii Clarifying the
standard further, the CCP held ‘that the definition of consumer as understood for the
purposes of Section 10 of [CA, 2010] is different than that of the US Federal Trade
Commission [(FTC)] or even the European Court of Justice (now Court of Justice for the
European Union(CJEU))’ (CCPb, paragraph 27). The CCP refused to follow the standard
of ‘reasonable consumer’ stated in the FTC Deception Policy Statement of 1984. iv In this
regard, in contrast to the FTC practice and interpretation, CCP held that ‘when
interpreting the term consumer for the purposes of Section 10, no subjective standard of
“reasonableness” is thrust upon the consumer’ (CCPb, paragraph 28). The CCP held, in
line with Zong and in contrast to FTC, that the undertakings have a responsibility to
ensure that their advertisements are not deceptive or misleading. v The CCP held that ‘the
focus is not on how much diligence or caution a consumer should exercise but rather the
efforts made by the undertaking to ensure that its advisement is clear, unambiguous and
truthful’ (CCPb, paragraph 28).
3. Basis of CCP’s ordinary consumer
a. Consumer protection
In Zong, the CCP held that one of the objectives of CA, 2010 is to ‘protect consumers
from anti-competitive practices’ and the consumer is the beneficiary of the law’ (CCPa,
p. 30). This was reiterated, specifically with regards to Section 10 CA, 2010, in the Paints
order that ‘the main aim of [Section 10] is consumer protection from anti-competitive
behaviour’ (CCPc, p. 17; CCPd, p. 32). Hence, the CCP aims for high consumer
protection for the Pakistani market and apparently, the standard of ‘ordinary consumer’ is
also chosen to achieve that aim.
b. Incardona & Poncibó (2007)
While discussing the standard of ordinary consumer in Zong, the CCP has exclusively
relied for justification on the conclusions of an article written by Rosella Incardona and
Cristina Poncibó published in the Journal of Consumer Policy in 2007. To fully
understand CCP’s standard of ‘ordinary consumer’ it is imperative to study the arguments
in this article.
6
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In their article, Incardona and Poncibó (2007) have critically examined the standard of
‘average consumer’ in EU cases in different areas including trademark law and unfair
competition. In the following, I will briefly describe that EU standard of ‘average
consumer’ followed by the criticism of Incardona and Poncibó.
The CJEU created the fiction of the ‘average consumer’ in Gut Springenheidevi, which
pertained to free movement of goods within the European Community. The court held
that the assessment of whether a statement or description to promote sales is misleading
is to be determined from the perspective of ‘an average consumer who is reasonably wellinformed and reasonably observant and circumspect’ (Gut Springenheide, paragraph 31).
This standard was followed in many CJEU and General Court’s (formerly the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities) decisions, before making its way in the
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCP Directive). Drawing upon the cases of the
CJEU and the General Court, the UCP Directive defined ‘average consumer’ as one ‘who
is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, taking into
account social, cultural and linguistic factors’ (UCP Directive, Recital 18). This standard
demands a more than average level of intelligence and cautiousness from the European
consumer. This is not only a criticism but has also been acknowledged by the European
Commission. Accordingly, the average consumer ‘is a critical person, conscious and
circumspect in his or her market behaviour. (S)he should inform themselves about the
quality and price of products and make efficient choices’ (European Commission, 2009,
p. 25). According to Mak (2010), ‘the consumer is presumed to be capable to work out
for herself whether products or services live up to their description or quality
requirements’ (Mak, 2010, p. 5).
Incardona and Poncibó do not agree with the high standard of ‘average consumer’ as
developed and applied in the EU law and practice. They consider that the average
consumer standard of the CJEU and the UCP Directive is that of the ‘traditional law and
economics’. According to them, in this standard,
‘consumers are viewed as rational actors able to estimate the
probabilistic outcomes of uncertain decisions and to select the
outcome which maximises their sense of well-being at the time the
decision is made. As a consequence of their assumed rationality,
7
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consumers would largely be held responsible for their own actions,
and the potential liability for the company would be greatly
reduced (Incardona & Poncibó (2007), p. 30) (emphasis added).’

In their opinion, the assumptions of perfect information and rational consumer of
‘traditional law and economics movement’ do not hold true for the real world as it is ‘the
economists’ idealistic paradigm of a rational consumer in an efficient marketplace’
(Incardona & Poncibó, 2007, p. 35). In reality, the consumers are not provided with
complete information and their purchase decisions are affected by a variety of factors
including cognitive biases such as imperfect recollection or perceptive decision-making
as well as external stimuli such as social influence. They argue that contemporary law,
should instead heed help from the emerging field of behavioural economics, according to
which ‘human beings are not completely rational, consistent, or even aware of the various
elements that enter into their decision making, and thus they often make poor choices,
seizing upon irrelevant considerations to support their decisions and ignoring important
ones’ (Incardona & Poncibó, 2007, p. 31) (internal citations omitted). Quoting Hanson
and Kysar (1999) they also argue that ‘consumers “are subject to host of cognitive biases
which make them susceptible to manipulation. Product manufacturers take advantage of
this consumer blindness and use advertising, promotions, and price setting to shape
consumer perceptions and maximise their profits’ (Incardona & Poncibó, 2007, p. 31).
On the basis of these and other arguments, Incardona and Poncibó conclude that the
‘average consumer test overlooks the real world of individual consumer behaviour and
sets an overly demanding standard for consumers’ (Incardona & Poncibó, 2007, p. 22).
c. CCP reliance on Incardona & Poncibó (2007)
As mentioned earlier, the CCP exclusively based all its arguments in favour of the notion
of ‘ordinary consumer’ based on Incardona and Poncibó (2007). Without defining the
concept of ‘average consumer test’ in EU law, the CCP quoted the criticism by Incardona
and Poncibó of the standard:
‘The average consumer test reflects the economists’ idealistic
paradigm of a rational consumer in an efficient marketplace. This
notion may be useful for economists’ calculations and projections,
8
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but departs from the unpredictable realities of individual human
behaviour and is hardly an appropriate standard for legislative or
judicial sanctions [...] Generally, consumers do not have the time
and resources at their disposal to acquire and process sufficient
information for rational decision-making. It is impossible for
consumers to devote all their intellectual, psychological, and
physical resources as well as their time to the gathering and
processing of information merely so that their choices can meet an
abstract economic notion. Even well-informed consumers of a high
intellectual and educational level, who would, at least in theory, be
ideally suited for rational market behaviour, may often base their
decisions on custom and feelings rather than on an analytical
process. Extensive, multi-dimensional information leads to a
significant decrease in the quality of consumer choice. Different
types of consumers possess different information processing and
perception abilities.’ (Incardona and Poncibó, 2007, p. 35; CCPa,
paragraph 25)
The CCP further quoted Incardona and Poncibó as follows:
‘The over-demanding average consumer test conflicts with the
overall system of EU consumer law resulting in many forms of
weak paternalism. The disclosure obligations, “cooling-off”
periods and the specific information required for certain sales, are
based on the idea that, in the heat of the moment, consumers might
make ill-considered or improvident decisions. The standard
justification for these regulations is that they will protect
consumers from unscrupulous, high-pressure and deceitful sellers
and lenders whilst simultaneously fostering a more competitive
marketplace and enhancing consumer confidence. Aware of
information asymmetries and of the fact that consumers often act
impulsively or in a way that they later regret, EU legislation does
not block their choices, but ensures a period for sober reflection.
This benevolent attention to consumer weakness is not present in
the average consumer test.’ (internal citation omitted) (Incardona
and Poncibó, 2007, p. 35; CCPa, paragraph 27).

The CCP also agreed, finding a lot of merit in the conclusions of Incardona and Poncibó
(2007) that ‘[w]e would not favour a return to unregulated laissez-faire marketing that
would transfer the burden of evidence from the seller, who has the advantage of intimate
knowledge of the product, to the buyer, who of necessity must make many, often
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instantaneous choices in the course of a day’ (Incardona and Poncibó, 2007, p.36; CCPa,
paragraph 28).
In refusing to follow the US standard of consumers acting reasonably, the CCP observed
that it is ‘governed by the provisions of [CA, 2010] and that the guidance gained from
any international law or precedent only has a persuasive value and is not enforceable.’
However, CA, 2010 does not provide any definition of the consumer, neither average nor
ordinary. The only way to read CCP’s created standard of ‘ordinary consumer’ in the
provisions of CA, 2010 is through the requirement of ‘reasonable basis’ for making any
claims in marketing practices from the undertaking. As this is the requirement made of
the undertaking, it seems that the CCP has taken it to mean that the analysis in Section 10
generally, and Section 10(2)(b) specifically, should focus on the claims made by the
undertaking by holding that ‘[u]nder Section 10 (2) (b) it is the undertaking which must
have a ‘reasonable basis’ for making any claims in an advertisement […] [T]he
determination of the ‘reasonableness’ of a consumer would not apply in the context of
Section 10’ (CCPb, paragraph 28).
4. Problem with the CCP standard
The raison d’être for consumer protection is the presumed imbalance between the powers
of buyers and sellers. This power imbalance comes from asymmetry of information
between these two market players. The latter possess more and better information about
products or services and their various characteristics. Moreover, the usual working of the
market also fails to incentivise the seller to make information available to the consumer
that may be helpful in making informed choices (Cseres, 2005, pp. 179-181). Resultantly,
consumers make suboptimal choices. Therefore, the need of state intervention in the form
of consumer protection laws and regulations to correct this market failure and to restore
the balance between buyers and sellers is undisputed. The problem arises in ascertaining
the correct degree of state intervention in the market to provide such information.
(Cseres, 2005). This is further compounded by the fact that consumers, in line with the
model of bounded rationality, are unable to make optimal decisions. This may happen
even where the market is able to provide them with all necessary information (Cseres,
2005; Incardona and Poncibó, 2007). Being boundedly rational, they may fail to
10
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comprehend such information. Therefore, understanding the level of rationality of the
consumer in a product or service market is the key to determine the extent of state
intervention.
Keeping in perspective the different schools of thought in Economics over the past few
decades as well as leading jurisdictions, various degrees of consumer rationality can be
depicted on a continuum, which I term as the ‘Consumer Rationality Continuum’. On the
one end of this continuum is the perfectly rational consumer of the Neo-classical
economics. This consumer possesses complete information of the product or service,
makes informed choices and maximises her utility from a set of available options (Simon,
1955). On the other end is the ordinary consumer of the CCP who does not possess any
capability of making informed choices in the marketplace. It appears that she completely
lacks the ability to decide for herself and needs patronage for every market decision.
Somewhere in the middle, but closer to the rational consumer, is the average consumer of
the EU, who is not perfectly rational but nonetheless well-informed and circumspect.
Though called average, this consumer appears to bear a high burden to knowledge and
responsibility of its acts in the market. The US reasonable consumer standard would also
lie in the middle, presumably not tilting towards either end.

Figure 1 - Consumer Rationality Continuum
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As I have understood Incardona and Poncibó (2007) arguments, they opine that the
consumer should not be pegged anywhere on this continuum. For them, the right standard
of the consumer is consumer, neither average nor vulnerable (Article 5(3) UCP Directive)
or ordinary. The consumer may lie anywhere on this continuum in accordance with the
type of product or service as well as depending upon various socio-economic and cultural
factors. They state that,
‘The parameter of the unfairness of a commercial practice is the
consumer […] who mirrors social, psychological, and cultural
factors and may even represent the overwhelming majority of
consumers. The consumer (like the trader, the creditor, the debtor,
the seller, and any other abstract person employed in abstract
norms) would serve the function of representing the whole of a
category and would be deemed per se averagely reasonable,
attentive, and/or even naturally vulnerable, without imposing or
requiring an artificial level of attention or reasonableness. […] The
consumer does not need to be always treated as a child but neither
should he or she be presumed to be Mr/Mrs I Know It All’
(Incardona and Poncibó, 2007, p. 36).

Whether their criticism of average consumer standard of the EU is correct from the
perspective of behavioural law and economics is a topic for another discussion. The point
to highlight here is that the CCP is committing the same error, which according to
Incardona and Poncibó, the CJEU and UCP Directive have committed: by characterizing
the Pakistani consumer as highly uninformed, gullible and impressionable, though not
claiming it in the exact words, the CCP, much to the dislike of the authors on whose
arguments they rest their case, is crystallizing the standard albeit at the other extreme of
the Consumer Rationality Continuum. Incardona and Poncibó argue for a better
assessment of consumers in a market. They do not argue for a strict consumer protection
approach where the consumer is considered vulnerable in all instances and the burden of
care is entirely shifted on sellers. By adopting the ordinary consumer standard, CCP does
just that. It is instructive that the CCP adopted this standard in a case that pertained to
cellular services where consumers were considered to be belonging to all segments of the
society. This observation shades the standard of consumer even in cases where the target
market is not as wide as that in the case of cellular services. Notwithstanding that, the
12
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consumers of cellular services in Pakistan may not be even as gullible and in need of
protection as the CCP considers. A recent study concluded that the consumers in Pakistan
are most inclined towards the cellular service whose messages they conceive as least
deceptive (Hasan, Subhani & Mateen, 2011). The study included responses from over
10,000 mobile phones users. The results of the study showed that the consumers could
make a difference between the services offered and the services received from cellular
companies. The fact that the consumers were more inclined towards the cellular service
with least deceptive messages is a glaring example of the Pakistani consumer not being
gullible or insensible.
Though the intention of the CCP to protect all consumers in the marketplace is worthy of
praise, it is neither warranted nor economically or socially desirable. The well-established
legal principle of ‘standard of care’vii, which has been set aside by the CCP in cases of
deceptive marketing practices, should not be considered a burden on the consumer. Apart
from making them vigilant, the requirement of diligence incentivises consumers to
educate themselves regarding the available subset of choices in the market and maximize
their utility, even if in a boundedly rational manner. By being partly responsible for their
choices, the consumer keeps increasing its knowledge pool as well as that of the society.
On the contrary, the ‘ordinary consumer’ standard has the potential of freezing the
consumer on its current level of knowledge (if any) and taking away the opportunity and
the need for the consumer to educate itself of the changing marketing environment with
the advent of new and advanced products. The ‘ordinary consumer’ standard, would not
only stifle this progress of consumer maturity in Pakistan, it may even lead to
unscrupulous consumer lawsuits against any and all marketing messages as being false or
misleading.
The above discussion clarifies that the ‘ordinary consumer’ standard is incompatible with
the assertions of Incardona and Poncibó (2007). This standard is not a reflection of actual
consumer behaviour in the market but its behaviour as perceived by the CCP. Consumer
markets differ from each other and so do consumers. The CCP’s assumption that the
ordinary consumer in Pakistan needs utmost protection in all cases and in all markets is
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unfounded, even in the cellular service industry, which according to it has the widest
amplitude.
In addition to its normative inconsistency both with economics and law, the ordinary
consumer standard is also out of line with the long-standing law and practice of the
trademark law in Pakistan to which I will turn next.
5. Consumer under the Pakistani Trademark law
The standard of consumer adopted by the CCP is not isolated from the workings of other
laws in Pakistan. The law of trademark (including passing off and unfair competition)
also contains the concept of consumer. Hence, it is important that the standard is the same
under both laws not only to ensure legal certainty, predictability and consistency for
marketers in developing their product and marketing strategies but also to meet consumer
expectations. This consistency is even more important as the Pakistani trademark law
also contains provisions relating to consumer protection (Sections 67 and 68 viii).
Similarly, the CA, 2010 also contains provision relating to fraudulent use of other’s
trademark (Section 10(2)(d)). It is thus imperative that the two laws are read and
interpreted harmoniously to avoid any conflicting results.
According to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the trademark law in Pakistan has a twofold objective: it benefits the traders by providing them the possibility of registering their
trademarks and excluding others from using them without authorization, and it also
benefits consumers by saving them ‘from being deceived by the acts of unscrupulous
manufacturers and sellers of goods bearing the fake trademarks for other’ (Alpha, 1990,
p. 1076). Keeping this in perspective, the superior courts of Pakistan have also adopted a
standard of consumer that has been consistently employed to analyse the cases of
consumer confusion and deception in trademark cases. It is important to note here that
trademarks not only include the brand names of a product or service or its packaging.
Companies are increasingly using trademark law in Pakistan for the protection of their
advertising slogans and marketing titles. Hence, the definition of consumer adopted in
trademark cases in Pakistan is of practical and utmost relevance for deceptive marketing
cases under CA, 2010.
14
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As early as 1963, the Pakistani case law relating to trademarks hinted that the Pakistani
consumer is not the theoretical ‘rational consumer’ of Neo-classical economics. In
Bengal Oil Mills (1963, p. 926), the West Pakistan High Court (now the High Court of
Sindh) held that the test of trademark deception ‘is not what thoughtful people would take
it to be, but how is the mind of common consumer affected by a mark’. A few years later,
in Bandenawaz (1967, p. 495), the court held that for ascertaining resemblance between
two trademarks, courts must take into account the likelihood of deception. Moreover, in
this analysis, ‘[t]he court must be careful to make allowance for imperfect recollection of
the [the trademark] and effect of careless pronunciation and speech [by the consumer]’.
In Glaxo Laboratories (1977, p.865), the court reiterated that the ultimate purchasers are
likely to be misled by imperfect recollection of trademarks’.
The above quotes show that Pakistani courts considered the Pakistani consumer a human
being, who is prone to cognitive biases such as imperfect recollection and who may, at
times, be (but not necessarily) a little careless with regard to pronunciation and speech
when making purchase decisions by referring to trademarks of products. The Supreme
Court of Pakistan further clarified this image of Pakistani consumer in 1984. In the
famous Jamia Industries Ltd (1984, p. 11-12), the Court held that the similarities of two
or more marks should be analysed from the perspective of an unwary purchaser where
she ‘would be exposed to reasonable probabilities of confusion and deception that the
goods of [one seller] carrying the proposed trade mark had their origin from [another
seller]’ (emphasis added). In other words, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
definition adopted by the lower courts that the Pakistani consumer was boundedly
rational. At the same time, by introducing the factor of reasonability in the test of
trademark deception, it clarified that the ‘unwary purchaser’ is not totally unsuspecting
and relieved of all duty of care and diligence. In this regard, the holding of a lower court
in another case is instructive. The High Court of Sindh in Sunkist (1987) explained the
lower limit of the Pakistani consumer’s intelligence in assessing deception and confusion
in trademark cases. The court held that in cases of similar or identical trademarks for
dissimilar goods deception and confusion must be judged by the perspective of ‘average
intelligent persons “with reasonable apprehension and proper eye-sight”.’ (Sunkist, 1987,
15
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p. 121). The court explained that ‘[t]he probable purchaser should be person of average
intelligence who takes care to at least observe prima facie facts floating on the surface
and not those who do not take care even to look at them. He should not be of
“phenomenal ignorance [or] extraordinary defective intelligence”’. It further held that in
cases of confusion and deception between two trademarks ‘the kind of errors to be
considered are not those which are absolute impossibilities, but there should be
reasonable probabilities.’ The court excluded the consumer from the fold of protection of
the law who is extremely careless and without proper understanding. The court relied
extensively on the case law from the UK and India where the same standard is followed.
The consumer under the Pakistani trademark law and practice can thus be summarized as
a person of average intelligence, who has the ability to observe obvious information but
also has imperfect recollection. The law does not require phenomenal intelligence but
also does not want the Pakistani consumer to be a fool or over-careless. Thus, the
Pakistani consumer under the trademark law has ordinary common sense and also the
burden of responsibility for its act as a boundedly rational human being.
6. The right standard of consumer?
The right standard of consumer is difficult to be pegged anywhere on the Consumer
Rationality Continuum. In fact the right standard is the one that is not pegged at one
place. It should depend upon the product or service in question and the attention required
in decision making by the consumer. In this regard, social, psychological and cultural
factors play an important role. Relieving consumer of all her responsibility for the
purchase decision is not the right way to move forward. Same is true for considering
consumer as perfectly rational. At the same time, starting the analyses assuming that
marketers are in the business of defrauding consumers is also a self-defeating approach.
Marketing campaigns are made to understand the consumer demand (both needs and
wants) and to satisfy them in a way that builds consumer confidence as well as brand
loyalty. This is not to say that there are no unscrupulous marketers out there. But they are
the exception and not the rule. Any sensible business would vie to build for itself an
image, which can be trusted by the consumers and results in customer loyalty. The
insensitive business should fall under the axe of Section 10 CA, 2010.
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As Economics has benefitted from the domain of psychology to better reflect consumer
rationality, law can seek help from the domain of marketing to determine its correct level.
At least from the perspective for the standard of consumer, there are parallels between the
two fields of study. The social, psychological and cultural factors that affect the decision
making of the consumer are already studied and analysed by the marketer and can
provide a good estimate of who the consumer is in individual cases for the purpose of
Section 10 CA, 2010.
Any product or service or marketing practice is geared towards a target market. This
target market is composed of thousands of unique human beings who differ from each
other in terms of preferences. Nonetheless, the product or service or the marketing
practice is usually not personalized for each consumer in the target market, especially for
standardised products. On the contrary, a consumer profile representative of the target
market is created. This may also be called the average customer, the average of all
customers (Kotler, 2001) (different from the EU standard of ‘average consumer’).
Once this profile is created and the various factors that shape a consumer’s purchase
decision are determined, the product or service and the ensuing marketing campaigns are
prepared keeping in perspective this representative consumer and such factors. As this
representative consumer is the one for whom the product, service or marketing offer is
developed, she is the most important criteria to judge whether a marketing practice is
potentially deceptive. This test takes into account the actual conceptualisation of the
consumer from the perspective of the marketer, who is, as mentioned earlier, in the
business of understanding consumer preference and present solutions accordingly. On the
contrary, a marketing practice that diverges from the representative consumer as created
by the marketer can potentially be considered deceptive taking into account the facts of
individual cases. Adopting this approach will enable the CCP to protect consumers in a
targeted way without unnecessarily sacrificing the goals of consumer education.
Moreover, this approach also allows singling out bad sheep that deliberately engage in
marketing practices that are meant to deceive from the rest of the flock.
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7. Conclusion
The Pakistani consumer is no different from the consumers in other markets in the world.
She can be very circumspect and well-informed in case of one marketing practice and
very credulous of the other. The ordinary consumer of CCP who is not responsible for
any of her decision is out of line with reality as much as the perfectly rational consumer
of Neo-classical economics. These two models are the extremes of Consumer Rationality
Continuum. Actual consumer falls between these two extremes. Where it actually falls is
a function of many factors, which includes the nature of the product and service, the
geographical market and socio-economic, psychological and cultural factors to name a
few. The best manifestation of the consumer is the one created by the marketer herself.
This is the consumer for whom the product or service or the marketing campaign is
created and she is the one who should not be deceived.
At the same time, it is also to be understood that under the Pakistani law the consumer
also has some responsibility for her own market decisions. This allows a continuous
process of consumer education. Matured consumers exert pressure on marketers and
sellers to provide not only accurate information for making informed choices, but also for
a continuous flow of better product and services with new and improved features.
I conclude that the concept of ordinary consumer adopted by the CCP in Zong and carried
forward in nine further orders is not only inconsistent with positive national and
international law but also raises normative issues specially in the context of marketing
and economics. Pakistani consumer is neither dumb nor dumber. She is boundedly
rational!
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i

All references to earlier versions of Competition Act, 2010 have been replaced by Competition Act, 2010,
which is the most current.
ii
Marketing practices that are directly harmful to the business interests of a competitor, irrespective of a
culpable harm to consumer interests would fall under Section 10(2)(a). On the other hand, marketing
practices that affect consumer choice and behavior to their detriment, which may also mean harm to
business interests of a competitor would fall under Section 10(2)(b). This difference has been
acknowledged in decisions of the Competition Commission of Pakistan. (CCPe, 2012, paragraph 3)
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iii

The standard has also been confirmed for the subsequent guidelines developed by the CCP relating to
deceptive marketing practices for the telecom sector. (CCPf, Undated)
iv
The test laid down by the FTC to analyse deceptive marketing practices is that:
1. there must be a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer;
2. the act or practice must be considered from the perspective of the reasonable consumer; and
3. the representation, omission or practice must be material. (FTC, 1984)
v
Apparently, this argument is predicated on the language of paragraph (b) of Section 10(2) of [CA, 2010]
interpreted subsequently by the CCP as meaning that ‘it is the undertaking which must have a “reasonable
basis” for making any claims in any advertisements’. (Banks, paragraph 28)
vi
But already in an earlier decision, Mars, the CJEU foresaw the customer to be reasonably circumspect
when comparing the size of publicity marking relating to an increase in a product and the size of that
increase. (Mars)
vii
The CCP states that the ‘“ordinary consumer” is not the same as the “ordinary prudent man” concept
evolved under contract law’ (CCPa, 2009, paragraph 32). As explained above, the ‘ordinary consumer’
does not need to show even ordinary diligence, any caution or duty of care or the ability to resolve inquiries
by herself. Diligence, prudence and care are similar concepts in law. Diligence is defined the as
‘[p]rudence; vigilant activity; attentiveness; or care […]’ (Black, 1995, p. 368). This is the opposite of
carelessness or negligence. There are at least three degrees of diligence in law: common or ordinary
diligence which is exercised with regards to one’s own concern and varies in accordance with the situation;
high or extra-ordinary diligence which is exercised by individuals of extra-ordinary intelligence or where
there is need for extra-ordinary care and low or slight which is less than common prudence and is exercised
by people with less than common prudence. (Black, 1995). The CCP rejects all three degrees of diligence
with regards to the ‘ordinary consumer’ by differentiating between the two standards.
viii
Most of the cases that have been decided under these sections of the trademark law relate to
infringement of unregistered trademarks, as area widely known as passing off under common law. There
the standard of consumer is the same as that with regards to registered trademarks as discussed in this
section.
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